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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
in any county adjacent to said United States Army Post or
Military reservation.20
North Carolina has a substantial military population. Whether our
legislature, like Kansas, would like to liberalize the usual rule of domi-
cile as to that population, requires considerations both political and
sociological in nature. At any rate, the serviceman's problem illustrates
but one of the strange results of the present divorce laws, having
domicile as a requirement.
21
H. WILLIAMv AsHLAw
Constitutional Law-Delegation of Legislative Authority to
Individuals*
In Wilcher v. Sharpe' the North Carolina Supreme Court was called
upon to decide the constitutionality of a city ordinance prohibiting the
erection of gins or mills "within the corporate limits of the town
without the consent of all property owners in three hundred feet of the
proposed site of building." The court held the ordinance invalid stating
that where the effectiveness of an ordinance determining the use of
property for a lawful purpose is conditioned upon the assent of private
persons, such as owners of adjacent property, it is an unconstitutional
grant of legislative power to private individuals.
This decision is in agreement with the often quoted rule that the
power conferred by the constitution upon the legislature to make laws
cannot be delegated by that body to individuals.2
In one of the earliest North Carolina cases considering this question,
Shaw v. Kennedy,3 where the town constable was given discretionary
power to "take up and sell all hogs running at large on the city street,"
2 KAe. GEN. STAT. § 60-1502 (1949). See also FLA. STAT. ANN. §21966
(1943) ; GA. CODE § 30-107 (1943) ; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1272 (1951).2 See Baer, The Aftermath of Williams vs. State of North Carolina, 28 N. C
L. REv. 265 (1950).
* The author is here primarily concerned with the status of the lav as to the
delegation of legislative authority to individuals in North Carolina. Reference
to official groups is made only where it appears as a link in the chain of the de-
velopment of this law by the court. Reference should be made, in conjunction with
this article, to Note, 7 NCL REv. 315 (1929) where the delegation of legislative
authority resulting from zoning ordinances is discussed.
1236 N. C. 308, 72 S. E. 2d 662 (1952); accord, Eubank v. Richmond, 226
U. S. 137 (1912) ; State of Washington ex rel Seattle Title Trust Co. v. Roberge,
278 U. S. 116 (1928) ; Willis v. Town of Woodruff, 200 S. C. 266, 20 S. E. 2d
699 (1942). Contra: Whitaker v. Green River Coal Co., 276 Ky. 43, 122 S. W.
2d 1012, 1016 (1938); State ex rel Standard Oil Co. v. Combs, 129 Ohio St. 251,
194 N. E. 875 (1935); City of Spokane v. Camp, 50 Wash. 554, 97 P. 770 (1908).2 N. C. CoNsT. Art. I § 8, Art. II §1; Cox v. City of Kinston, 217 N. C. 391,
8 S. E. 2d 252 (1940). See I CoOLEv's CONSTITUTIONAL LImITATIONS, 434 (1927);
11 Amr. JuR., Legislatures to Individu als, 221; 70 ALR 1064.
24 N. C. 591 (1817) ; accord, People ex rel Bernat v. Bicek, 405 IIl. 510, 91
N. E. 2d 588 (1950); McCown v. Gose, 244 Ky. 402, 51 S. W. 2d 251 (1932).
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the court said the ordinance was not in accord with the "laws of the
land" and held the ordinance invalid seemingly on the grounds that
it conferred arbitrary powers upon the constable. The court did not
mention directly the fact that it granted legislative authority to an in-
dividual, but this may be taken to be the true meaning of the phrase
"laws of the land." In 1853, however, in Hill v. Bonner4 the court
by, way of deliberate dictum stated that any act tending to grant the
people legislative authority would be void. Then in Thompson v.
Floyd (1855) 5 the court stated, "The General Assembly can delegate
any portion of its legislative functions to any man or set of men, acting
either in an individual or corporate capacity." The court was very
careful to continue its discussion, however, by pointing out that the in-
dividuals concerned by the act in question were acting merely as agents
of the legislature to carry out its desired functions, and could not in
any way "alter or amend the law in the slightest particular."6 But the
court at no time mentioned the dictum in the Hill case.
Four years later in Manly v. City of Raleigh7 the court upheld an
act of the legislature extending the city limits of Raleigh, which de-
pended upon the approval of the mayor and commissioners for its be-
coming effective, and cited the language in the Thompson case in reach-
ing its conclusion that the law did not violate the constitution.8 The
court furthei conclusively intimated that similar laws depending for
validity on their acceptance by any individuals or groups of individuals,
would not be unconstitutional.
By 1887 the trend toward liberal construction of the rule prohibiting
delegation of legislative authority to individuals seemed well estab-
lished.9 In State v. Yopp'O the court held valid a statute forbidding
'44 N. C. 257 (1853); accord, Patterson v. Jefferson County, 238 Ala. 442,
191 S. E. 681 (1939) ; See Daigh v. Schaffer, 23 Cal. App. 2d 449, 73 P. 2d 927
(1937), (holding a grant of judicial authority to an individual invalid).
47 N. C. 313, 315 (1855); cf. Cody v. City of Detroit, 289 Mich. 499, 286
N. W. 805 (1939) (where the court held the consent of an individual being
used for no greater purpose than to waive a restriction which legislative authority
created, is within constitutional limitations).
'The statute in question made it possible for a majority of the the Justices
of the Peace in Robeson County by agreement to abolish jury trials by the county
courts within their county-remarkably similar to the grant declared unconstitu-
tional in the principal case.
757 N. C. 370 (1859) ; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356 (1886) (where
the court states: "The very idea that one man may be compelled to hold ... any
material right essential to the enjoyment of life at the will of another is intoler-
able.").
' The court, however, in reference to Hill v. Bonner, at p. 377, stated in
speaking of this type legislation: "although it may be an abuse of power greatly
to be deprecated as tending to subvert the principles of our representative form
of government, still the power has been granted, and it is not the province of one
branch of the government to correct the supposed abuses of the other."
' Cain v. Commissioners, 86 N. C. 8 (1882) ; State v. Chambers, 93 N. C. 600
(1885) (recognizing the validity of contingent legislation depending on majority
approval by voters before becoming enforceable law). Cf. N. C. GEN. STAT. 518-
1953]
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the use of certain type vehicles on a Wilmington company road without
"the express permission of the superintendent of said road," saying
this was a police regulation and the superintendent an agent of the
law. The statute contained no criteria for the exercise of this discre-
tion, and the court, taking for granted that it would be used "hon-
estly, fairly, reasonably and without prejudice," would likely have held
it unconstitutional had there appeared an abuse of the power granted."
The apparent question of delegation of legislative authority to indi-
viduals was not discussed.
In 1892 the famous case of State v. TenantU2 decided the consti-
tutionality of an Asheville ordinance prohibiting the "building, addi-
tion to, or improvement upon" any building in the city without first
obtaining the permission of the city aldermen. The ordinance was held
invalid as subjecting "the right of property to the despotic will of alder-
men."' 3 This decision would indicate a reversion on the part of the
court to its original view requiring strict interpretation of the rule
against delegation of legislative authority, if the circumstances in the
case under consideration did not differ essentially from those found
expressing the more liberal attitude of the court. In the immediate
case the aldermen had refused an Asheville hospital permission to
enlarge its facilities without stating reasons for so doing. The court
relied on this apparent "abuse of discretion" as a grounds for reaching
its desired conclusion. A similar decision would no doubt have re-
sulted had the aldermen been "private individuals" as was dealt with in
the principal case.
At this same term, in State v. Barringer,'4 a statute prohibiting
the manufacture of. liquor within three miles of Barium Springs
Orphanage without the written consent of the Orphanage superintendent
was held valid, the court rationalizing and saying that even if that
portion of the statute requiring the superintendent's consent were in-
61 (granting option as to the operation of county liquor stores to majority of
voters in county to be affected).
10 97 N. C. 477, 482, 2 S. E. 458 (1887); cf. City of Cairo v. Coleman, 53
Ill. App. 680 (1894) ; Bill v. City of Goshen, 117 Ind. 221, 20 N. E. 115 (1889) ;
Town of Trenton v. Clayton, 50 Mo. App. 535 (1892) (ordinances granting mayor
or other official arbitrary power to approve or withhold licenses were held in-
valid).
" State v. Austin, 114 N. C. 855, 19 S. E. 919 (1894) ; State v. Hundley, 195
N. C. 377, 142 S. E. 330 (1928) (emphasizing the importance of prohibiting the
abuse of discretion allowed in city ordinances). Accord, Duffy v. Hurley, 402 Ill.
562, 85 N. E. 2d 26 (1949).
- 110 N. C. 609, 14 S. E. 387 (1892).
"S Accord, Kellerman v. City of Philadelphia, 139 Pa. Super. 569, 13 A. 2d 84
(1940). Cf. Thorpe v. Mayor, 13 Ga. App. 767, 79 S. E. 949 (1913) (where the
court held ordinance granting city official power to refuse or grant a license at his
discretion to be valid, but warned against the "unreasonable" use of such dis-
cretion).
14 110 N. C. 525, 14 S. E. 781 (1892). Cf. Beacon Liquors v. Martin, 279
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valid, this would not mean the entire statute was bad; thus the pro-
hibition would be effective and the same result, as to the manufacturer,
reached.15  During this year the court also drew the distinction be-
tween a grant of "power to adopt rules and regulations to carry into
effect a law already passed" and a grant of "power to pass a law,"'16
but this distinction was not mentioned in the Barringer case.
In 1916 the court in State v. Bass"7 held an ordinance unconsti-
tutional which prohibited any person from building a privy or stable in
closer proximity to his neighbor's house than his own. Although the
court quoted with approval the words of the Attorney General de-
scribing the ordinance as a grant of legislative authority to individuals
by the town commissioners, the ordinance was held invalid principally
on the grounds that it did not operate equally on all people. Following
this decision in 1925 the court restated the general rule that legislative
authority cannot be delegated, but the power to determine some fact or
state of things upon which the law makes or intends to make its own
action depend is valid.' 8
However, in the well reasoned case of Bizzel v. City of Goldsboro'9
the court once again found a seeming abuse of discretion on the part
of city aldermen. City ordinances prohibiting the erection of gasoline
filling stations without first obtaining the consent of the board of
aldermen were held invalid as failing to prescribe a uniform rule for
the granting of such permits and thus permitting discrimination against
some property owners. The question of improper delegation of legis-
lative authority to individuals was not discussed; the court apparently
Ky. 468, 131 S. W. 2d 446 (1939) (where court reached same result on basis that
legislation involved was contingent, and present social complexities warrant
more liberal holdings concerning the delegation of legislative authority to indi-
viduals).
"It is interesting to note the similarity between the statute then under con-
sideration and G. S. 116-42 (1794) and G. S. 116-43 (1824). These more encom-
passing sections, which have apparently gone uncontested to the present day, re-
quire the consent of the University president to "set up, maintain or keep in
Chapel Hill, or within five miles thereof" any public billiard table, bowling alley,
etc., or to operate any other games of chance or skill, or" ... . exhibit. .. any
dramatic recitation, . . . or any concert,. serenade or performance in music, singing
or dancing. ..."
"0 Atlantic Express Co. v. Railroad, 111 N. C. 463, 16 S. E. 393 (1892). See
also, Morgan v. Stewart, 144 N. C. 424, 57 S. E. 149 (1907) ; State v. Railroad,
141 N. C. 846 (1906).
:1 171 N. C. 780, 87 S. E. 972 (1916); accord, City of St. Louis v. Russell,
116 Mo. 248, 228 S. W. 470 (1893). Contra, City of Chicago v. Stratton, 162 Ill.
494. 44 N. E. 853 (1895).
18Durham Provision Company v. Daves, 190 N. C. 7, 128 S. E. 593 (1925);
State v. Garner, 158 N. C. 630, 74 S. E. 458 (1912) ; cf. Hollingsworth v. State
Board of Barber Examiners, 217 Ind. 373, 28 N. E. 2d 64 (1940) ; Revne v. Trade
Commission, 192 P. 2d 563 (Utah, 1948) (where statutes providing for minimum
price agreements and opening and closing hour agreements between barbers upon
approval by 80% of the barbers concerned were held invalid).
10 192 N. C. 348, 135 S. E. 50 (1926).
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conceding the authority of city officials to enforce similar requirements
providing they were not discriminatory. In a strong and able dissent
Chief Justice Stacy, who was of the opinion that no constitutional
boundary had been invaded, reasoned that discretionary powers were
a necessity in our increasingly complex society. This dissent, of course,
reaffirms the doctrine expressed in State v. Yopp sanctioning discre-"
tionary power in officials.
Ely Lilly Co. v. Saunders,"0 decided in 1929, held price fixing con-
tracts between wholesalers and retailers valid and held the statute in-
volved to "delegate nothing" saying it was complete upon leaving the
hands of the legislature. The court quoted with approval 11 Am. Jur.,
p. 933, as follows: "The statute is not a delegation of power to private
persons to control the disposition of property of others, because the
restriction, already imposed with the knowledge of the prospective re-
seller runs with the acquisition of the purchased property and condi-
tions it." A strong dissent by Justice Barnhill, however, seems to pre-
sent a valid criticism that this is an improper delegation of authority.
In 1948, Janws v. Sutton21 decided that the statutory zoning power
of a governing body of a municipality cannot be delegated to a board
of adjustment; therefore, a decision by the lower court that a "non-
conforming use" could be made of certain property, if approved by the
board, was held in error, the court feeling that this would empower
the board to amend or change, rather than abide by, the law.
Thus the status of the North Carolina law concerning the grant of
legislative authority to individuals seems to be far from settled and
inflexible. Although the principal case unequivocally states that legis-
lative authority will not be delegated to "private individuals," it is
questionable as to what extent "private" may be taken. The earlier
North Carolina cases approving the apparent use of legislative authority
by an Orphanage superintendent, or the superintendent of a company
roadway were not, as appears from the reported case, considered by
the court in the principal decision. It would seem difficult, to say the
least, to adjudge such persons as other than private individuals. Fur-
ther, where the legislative grant has been to officials rather than "pri-
vate" persons, the court has generally upheld the grant unless an abuse
of the power granted is shown; or, as in the principal case, the court
believes an opposite result would be more desirable after consideration
of the circumstances involved. The court in the past, as it probably
20216 N. C. 163, 177, 4 S. E. 2d 528 (1939)..
1 f229 N. C. 515, 50 S. E. 2d 300 (1948) ; accord, 226 N. C. 107, 37 S. E. 2d
128 (1946). But see, Washington v. Hammond, 76 N. C. 33 (1877) (where court
says municipal ordinances must be "in harmony with the general laws of the
state."). Cf. Gdreib v. Fox, 145 Va. 554, 134 S. E. 914 (1927), cert granted, 274
U. S. 603 (1927) (where court approved and lauded the grant of "some discre-
tion" to city officials).
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will in the future, has, along with other principal jurisdictions, engaged
quite frequently and adeptly in the art of verbal rationalization to
achieve an equitable end despite the general rule against the delegation
of legislative authority to an individual.
LAcy H. THORNBURG
Criminal Law-Former Jeopardy-Effect of Mistrial Resulting
from Prosecutor's Inability to Proceed
Where the state's principal witnesses refused to testify on the
ground of self-incrimination, the trial court declared a mistrial over the
defendant's objection. Subsequently, when the state was able to pro-
cure the testimony of the witnesses the defendant was tried by a new
jury and convicted of unlawful secret assault over his objection that he
had been in jeopardy at the first trial. The North Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed1 the conviction and certiorari was granted by the United
States Supreme Court wherein it was held in a five to two decision that
the declaring of a mistrial and requiring the defendant to be presented
to another jury, in accordance with North Carolina practice, was not a
violation of the due process clause of the Federal Constitution.
2
The Federal3 and most state4 constitutions guarantee that a person
shall not twice be in jeopardy for the same offense. In those states
where the constitution is'silent, former jeopardy is a part of the common
law,' but it is not one of the privileges and immunities protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.6 By the greater weight of authority jeopardy
attaches within the constitutional provision or the common law at the
time a proper jury is impaneled and sworn to hear the evidence.7 Dis-
charge of the jury thereafter absent manifest legal necessity for so
'State v. Brock, 234 N. C. 390, 67 S. E. 2d 282 (1951).
-Brock v. State of North Carolina, 73 S. Ct. 349 (1953).
'U. S. CONsT. AMEND V.
'1 BisHop, CRIMINAL LAW §981 (9th ed. 1923).
' The Constitutions of Connecticut, Maryland, Massachusetts, North Carolina:,
and Vermont do not contain prohibitions against double jeopardy; however, each
of these states has the prohibition as part of its common law. State v. Benham,
7 Conn. 414 (1829) ; Gilpin v. State, 142 Md. 464, 121 Atl. 354 (1923) ; Common-
wealth v. McCan, 277 Mass. 199, 178 N. E. 633 (1931) ; State v. Clemmons, 207
N. C. 276, 176 S. E. 760 (1934) ; State v. O'Brien, 106 Vt 97, 170 Atl. 98 (1934).
Eight states, because of specific constitutional provisions, hold that there must be
an acquittal or conviction before jeopardy attaches. See A. L. I., Administration
of the Criminal Law, Commentary to § 6 (Proposed final draft for 1935) for a
complete listing of the Constitutional provisions.
0 In Palko v. State of Connecticut, 302 U. S. 319 (1937), the state appealed
pursuant to a Connecticut statute whereupon a reversal for errors of law was
obtained. It was held that the statute was constitutional since the due process
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not protect an individual against double
jeopardy in a prosecution by a state. Hence, the Connecticut statute here in ques-
tion does not necessarily violate the Fourteenth Amendment because a similar act
of the federal government would violate the Fifth Amendment.
'22 C. J. S. Criminal Law § 241 n. 64 (1940).
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